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Abstract-Charging a higher price during periods of 
congestion should more efficiently allocate scarce resources by 
encouraging users to conserve. We study its benefits by 
conducting several pricing experiments over two semesters with 
students in the dormitories using a computer-telephony-service. 
Users can use the service to make and receive phone calls from 
their computers or phones. While we do not charge users real 
money, we limit each user to a certain number of tokens a week. 
With this experimental setup, we conducted a different pricing 
experiment each week to better understand how prices can be 
used to entice users to talk less, talk at another time, or use a 
lower quality connection.   
With our token scheme as a budget constraint, we can use 
static pricing policies to influence users’ behaviors, but cannot 
use a simple congestion pricing scheme to encourage users to 
talk less. For example, we can use time-of-day pricing to 
encourage users to shift 30% of their usages from the peak to 
the off-peak hours. We can also use call-duration pricing, a 
higher rate as a call lasts longer, to encourage 3 times as many 
calls (18% instead of 6%) to terminate after a price increase. 
However, when using a simple congestion pricing scheme that 
charges a rate depending on the number of people calling, we 
find that we cannot get users to terminate their calls earlier. We 
believe that users do not change their behaviors because they do 
not know how long the price increases or decreases will last. 
Thus to make a congestion pricing scheme more effective, we 
believe that the price changes need to be more permanent to 
entice users to change their behaviors
1. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Congestion pricing, charging a higher price when a 
resource usage is approaching its capacity, should be able to 
more efficiently allocate scarce resources by encouraging 
some users to conserve more. Thus, it can benefit the service 
providers by better utilizing the available resources and 
reducing the need for over-provisioning. It can also benefit 
the users by reducing congestion and avoiding degraded 
services. 
The state-of-the-art on congestion pricing consists mostly 
of theoretical work. Several seminal papers [1,2,3] state the 
advantages and disadvantages of congestion pricing. Other 
papers [4,5,6,7] prove and simulate the benefits of congestion 
pricing using mathematical models for predicting user 
behaviors. However, there is no reported experience of using 
congestion pricing in a real system. There are also no user 
studies that measure the actual benefits of congestion pricing 
when compared with other pricing policies.  
                                                 
1 We confirmed this hypothesis in later congestion pricing experiments. 
We conducted a user study with congestion pricing using a 
computer-telephony-service. Users can use the service to 
make and receive phone calls from their computers or 
phones. The service is similar to Internet telephony services 
like Dialpad and Net2Phone. We limit each user to a certain 
number of tokens a week and charge him/her a certain token 
rate for using the service. We deployed the service to students 
in the dormitories for two semesters. During the Fall of 2000, 
we had 41 students signed up and during the Spring of 2001, 
we had 91 students. With this setup, we conducted several 
pricing experiments to better understand congestion pricing.  
With our token scheme as a budget constraint, we can use 
static pricing policies - prices are known to users beforehand 
- to change user behaviors. However, we cannot use a simple 
congestion pricing scheme to encourage users to talk less 
during congestion. For example, we can use time-of-day 
pricing - a static policy that charges a higher rate during peak 
hours – to successfully encourage users to shift 30% of their 
usages from the peak to the off-peak hours. We also can use 
call-duration based pricing - another static pricing policy that 
increases the rate as a call lasts longer – to encourage 3 times 
as many calls (18% instead of 6%) to terminate in the next 
minute after a price increase. However, when we use a simple 
congestion pricing scheme, we cannot get more people to 
terminate their calls after a price increase. We believe the 
reason is that they do not know how long the price increases 
or decreases will last. Thus to make congestion pricing more 
effective, we believe that the price changes need to be more 
permanent, or that the durations of the congested periods 
need to be more predictable, so that users can be more enticed 
to change their behaviors
1.  
For the rest of this paper, we first discuss the related work 
on congestion pricing. We then describe the computer-
telephony-service and the pricing experiments. Afterwards, 
we discuss how we deploy the service to conduct the 
experiments. Finally, we describe the experimental results 
before concluding with our findings. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Many papers [1,2] favor using congestion pricing for 
allocating scarce resources. They argue that congestion 
pricing can reduce congestion, better utilize available 
resources, send correct signals about expansion, and not place 
artificial limits on usages. However they also point out that 
congestion pricing requires a more complicated accounting 
mechanism, offers less predictable prices, and has users in the 
control loop. Fishburn and Odlyzko [3] also argue that flat-
rate pricing is better than congestion pricing in the context of Internet bandwidth because it only requires a little bit more 
resource to gradually improve quality for everyone.  
Several papers [4,5,6] use proofs and simulations to 
analyze congestion pricing. They show that congestion 
pricing can better utilize network resources and increase 
users’ utilizations. However, Paschalidis and Tsitsiklis [7] 
show through their simulations that a static pricing policy like 
time-of-day pricing is almost as good as congestion pricing. 
These simulations depend a lot on how one models user 
reactions to changing prices. 
We are unaware of reported experience with using 
congestion pricing in a real system. However, with regard to 
prototyping efforts, Stiller, et al. [8] use emulated routers to 
demonstrate that an IP telephony system can use congestion 
pricing for allocating bandwidth at IP routers. They simulate 
holding periodic auctions at each router for deciding whose 
voice-over-IP calls can transmit IP packets through it. 
Nevertheless, without real experience, we cannot know the 
appropriate schemes for setting congestion prices or 
presenting the prices to users. 
To our knowledge, there are no reported user studies with 
using congestion pricing in a real system. However, Klausz, 
Croson, and Croson [9] have done a study using simulated 
games where users participate in auctions of scarce resources. 
They find that the prices set in these simulated auctions can 
increase utilization and reduce congestion. The INDEX 
project [10] performed a user study to measure user demand 
for Internet access using usage-based pricing. Usage-based 
pricing informs users the prices beforehand and charges 
according to how much resources they use. In contrast, 
congestion pricing modifies prices in the middle of a usage to 
reflect the current congestion. They find that the different 
pricing policies, like by volume or by connect time, can 
significantly impact user demand. For each pricing policy, 
they find that the demand is very sensitive to prices and that 
the difference among users is persistent and large. They also 
find that users can quickly adapt to a new pricing policy. 
These findings are very encouraging for our work on using 
congestion pricing for allocating resources.  
III. COMPUTER-TELEPHONY-SERVICE 
We use a computer-telephony-service to conduct our 
pricing experiments because it has many desirable properties. 
First, phone calls are long enough that users can react to 
changing prices. Thus we can modify prices to encourage 
users to talk less, talk at another time, or talk using a lower 
quality connection. Second, calls go through gateways 
between the Internet and the PSTN. These are obvious 
bottlenecks because of the limited phone lines to the PSTN. 
Thus we can easily perform monitoring, admission control, 
accounting, and price settings at these places.   
Users can use our service to make and receive phone calls 
from their computers or phones. From a computer, users can 
go to a web page, log in, and then enter the numbers they 
wish to call. See Fig. 1 for the web interface. When making 
calls from a computer, users will see on the web page real-
time pricing information, like the current rate, the next 
minute rate, the call duration, the call charge, and the number 
of tokens they have left. From a phone, users can call a phone 
number, enter their user ids and pins, and then enter the 
numbers they want to call. The phone interface is very similar 
to using a calling card. When using a phone, users will hear 
the current price at the beginning of a call and whenever the 
price changes. They can also use the service to receive 
incoming calls from any computer or phone and then redirect 
them to their computers or phones as they choose. 
 
Fig 1. Web interface for using the service from a computer. 
We implement the service using the H.323 protocol [11]. 
See Fig. 2 for a picture of the service’s architecture. We use a 
Motorola Vanguard 6560 as a H.323 gateway to connect the 
Internet to the PSTN. We use a Primary Rate ISDN line to 
support 23 simultaneous calls between the gateway and the 
PSTN. We then implement a H.323 proxy for the gateway to 
perform functions like monitoring, admission control, 
accounting, and price setting. Users on their computers can 
use a web browser in conjuncture with a H.323 client like the 
Microsoft NetMeeting to make calls through the gateway via 
the proxy.  
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Fig. 2. Architecture for the computer-telephony-service. 
There are only two modifications we needed to add to the 
service to support congestion pricing instead of flat-rate 
pricing. First we need to modify the accounting mechanisms 
on the H.323 proxy to generate an accounting record every 
minute instead of every call to better support dynamic prices. 
Second, we need to modify the proxy to provide real-time 
pricing information to users on their computers and phones 
either as updates on the web page or as recorded messages in 
the middle of a call.   IV. PRICING POLICIES 
We initially use the computer-telephony-service to 
experiment with the following five pricing policies: 
•  Flat-rate pricing – same rate all the time. 
•  Congestion pricing – a rate that rises and falls with the 
total number of active calls. 
•  Time-of-day pricing – a higher rate during the peak 
hours. 
•  Call-duration pricing – a higher rate as a call lasts longer. 
•  Access-device pricing – a higher rate when using a 
phone and a lower rate when using a computer. 
We use a flat-rate pricing as a worst case for comparison 
with congestion pricing. We select time-of-day pricing and 
call-duration pricing because they are static pricing policies 
that have the benefits of congestion pricing. Time-of-day 
pricing can encourage users to talk at another time while call-
duration pricing can encourage users to talk shorter. We 
decide to experiment with access-device pricing because it 
can help reduce the load on the bottleneck resource, the 
phone lines to the PSTN, when users use their computers 
instead of phones to access the service.  
V. DEPLOYMENT 
We deployed the service to students in the dormitories 
during the Fall of 2000 and Spring of 2001 semesters. We 
target the students in the dormitories because they have good 
Internet connections, Ethernet access, and regular PSTN 
phones in their rooms. Students are familiar with using 
computers and like to talk on the phones. We had 41 users 
signed up during the Fall and 91 users during the Spring. Our 
users are mostly freshmen and sophomores, and come from a 
wide variety of departments. 
We use a token system as a budget constraint that limits 
each user to 1000 free tokens a week and charges her/him a 
certain token rate for using the service. The unused tokens 
disappear at the end of the week so that we can perform a 
different pricing experiment each week. We do not charge 
users real money because it would have complicated the 
approval process for performing our user study in the 
dormitories.    
Users can use our service to make and receive phone calls 
from their computers or phones. However, we limited the 
outgoing calls to only the San Francisco Bay Area during the 
Fall, but extended the call area to all of California during the 
Spring. Admittedly, our users have many options for making 
and receiving phone calls. On their computers, they can use 
free Internet telephony services like Dialpad and Net2Phone 
to make free long distance calls. However, our service has 
better voice quality because it is on the same local area 
network as their computers. On their phones, they can make 
free local calls or pay for long distance calls. Half of our 
users also have cell phones. Thus these outside options make 
it more challenging for us to use our token scheme to affect 
our users’ calling behaviors.  
Table 1 shows the pricing experiments we conducted 
during the two semesters. All the users face the same pricing 
policy each week. We started with access-device pricing 
because it is the easiest pricing policy for users to understand, 
a higher price for using a phone and a lower price for using a 
computer. We then experimented with static pricing policies, 
simple policies like time-of-day pricing and call-duration 
pricing, before experimenting with a more complicated policy 
like congestion pricing. In between these experiments, we 
used flat-rate pricing as a basis for comparison. The 
experiments are announced several weeks beforehand and 
users are reminded of the experiment in the beginning of the 
week. At the end of the week, users receive email statements 
describing their usages.    
TABLE 1 
PRICING POLICIES FOR THE TWO SEMESTERS. 
Week 
Ending 
Pricing Policy  Active 
Users 
Total 
Calls 
Total 
Minutes 
10/16/00  flat-rate: 10 tokens/min  12  102  612 
10/23/00 access-device:   
computer: 10 tokens/min 
phone: 20 tokens/min  15 91  406 
10/30/00  flat-rate: 10 tokens/min  12  92  702 
11/6/00   access-device:  
computer: 10 tokens/min 
phone:30 tokens/min  12 61  367 
11/13/00   time-of-day:  
11pm-7pm: 10 tokens/min 
7pm-11pm: 30 tokens/min  13 117  657 
11/20/00   call-duration:  
1
st-3
rd min: 10 tokens/min 
3
rd min on: 30 tokens/min  12  59  349 
11/27/00  
(Thanks-
giving)  
congestion: 10X tokens/min 
X: number of simultaneous 
calls  10 63  530 
12/4/00   congestion: 10X tokens/min 
X: number of active calls   14 85  837 
12/11/00   flat-rate: 5 tokens/min  12  110  1238 
2/12/01   flat-rate: 10 tokens/min  15  74  553 
2/19/01   time-of-day:  
11pm-7pm: 10 tokens/min 
7pm-11pm: 30 tokens/min  21 133  927 
2/26/01   call-duration:  
1
st-3
rd min: 5 tokens/min 
3
rd–10
th min: 10 tokens/min 
11
th-20
th min: 20 tokens/min 
21
th min on: 30 tokens/min  31  128  961 
3/5/01   flat-rate: 10 tokens/min  41  196  1925 
3/12/01   congestion: 10X tokens/min 
X: number of active calls  42 251  2078 
3/19/01  congestion: 5X tokens/min  
X: number of active calls  42  282  2445 
3/26/01  flat-rate: 5 tokens/min  40  296  2441 
4/2/01 
(Spring 
break) 
call-duration:  
1
st-5
rd min: 5 tokens/min 
6
rd–15
th min: 10 tokens/min 
16
th-25
th min: 20 tokens/min 
26
th min on: 30 tokens/min  28 134  660 
During the Fall, we had about 15 users using the service 
each week and during Spring, we had about 42 users a week. 
Table 1 shows that number of active users using the service 
each week and the total number of calls and minutes they 
made. Each week, about half of the users used up all their  
tokens. VI. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
Flat-Rate Pricing 
We find that the results under flat-rate pricing are as 
expected. As we decrease the price from 10 tokens a minute 
to 5 tokens a minute, we find that each user uses the service 
more. This suggests that we do place a budget constraint on 
users by constraining each user to 1000 tokens a week and 
charging about 10 tokens a minute. In Fig. 3, we graph the 
calling pattern containing all the calls under flat-rate pricing. 
We observe that are obvious peak hours between 7pm-11pm 
where 54% of the usages occur during that time period.   
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
02468 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0 2 2 2 4
Time of Day (Hour)
U
s
a
g
e
 
(
M
i
n
u
t
e
)
 
Fig. 3. Calling pattern of all the calls under flat-rate pricing. 
In Fig. 4, we graph the percentage of calls that are longer 
than a certain duration. We find that about 30% of the calls 
are longer than 5 minutes, 20% longer than 11 minutes, and 
10% longer than 23 minutes. Thus for call-duration pricing, 
we can predict the percentage of calls that will experience a 
price increase when we increase the price after a certain 
duration. In Fig. 5, we also graph the probability that a user 
will drop a call after a certain duration. We find that after the 
3
rd minute, the probability that a call will get dropped in the 
next minute is about a constant, 5.8% with a standard error of 
0.4%. 
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Fig. 4. Under flat-rate pricing, the percentage of calls longer than a certain 
duration.  
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
1 3 5 7 9 11131517192123252729313335
Call Duration (Minute)
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
a
 
U
s
e
r
 
T
e
r
m
i
n
a
t
i
n
g
 
a
 
C
a
l
l
 
Fig. 5. Under flat-rate pricing, the probability that a user will terminate a call 
after a certain duration. 
Time-Of-Day Pricing 
For time-of-day pricing, we decided to first experiment 
with charging 30 tokens during the peak hours, 7pm-11pm, 
and 10 tokens during the off-peak hours, 11pm-7pm. We 
selected 30 tokens because we want a big price difference to 
see how much we can entice users to shift their usages. We 
performed the time-of-day experiment twice, once in the Fall 
and once in the Spring. When comparing their results with 
the flat-rate pricing the week before and the week afterwards, 
we find that we can encourage each user to shift about 30% 
of his usages from the peak to the off-peak hours. In Fig. 6, 
we aggregate the calls from the two time-of-day experiments 
and scale it to overlay with the flat-rate calling pattern in Fig. 
3. We observe that with the 20 tokens price difference, the 
peak usage is over-shifted to before and after the 7-11pm 
period. We also observe a small peak around 11am from calls 
made during the weekends. Thus the results from the time-of-
day experiments demonstrate that we can use our token 
scheme to entice users to call at another time. 
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Fig. 6. Flat-rate pricing versus time-of-day pricing. 
Call-Duration Pricing 
We conducted three experiments with call-duration pricing 
and find that it can encourage users to talk less. For all the 
experiments, we inform users in the beginning of the week 
when a price increase will occur. In the first experiment, we 
increase the price after the 3
rd minute and cannot cause more 
calls to terminate. In the second experiment, we increase the 
price after the 3
rd, the 10
th, and the 20
th minute. We find that 
the price increase after the 3
rd minute again has no effect, but 
the price increase after the 10
th and the 20
th minute cause 
about 3 times as many calls, 18% instead of 5.6%, to 
terminate in the next minute. See Fig. 7 for a comparison of 
the second call-duration experiment with the flat-rate 
behavior in Fig. 5. In the third experiment, we increase the 
price after the 5
th, the 15
th, and the 25
th minute and are again 
able to cause about 3 times as many calls to terminate after 
each price increase. Thus our results from the call-duration 
experiments show that we can use our token system to 
encourage users to talk less after a price increase.  0
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Fig. 7. Flat-rate pricing versus call-duration pricing with the price increase 
after the 3
rd, the 10
th, and the 20
th minute of a call. 
Congestion Pricing 
For congestion pricing, we decided to set the current price 
as a function of the number of simultaneous calls on the 
service. Thus we increase the price when more people are 
calling and decrease the price when less people are calling. 
We conducted two congestion pricing experiments during the 
Spring semester. In the first experiment, we set the price 
equal to ten times the number of simultaneous calls. In the 
second experiment, we set it to five times. During the 
experiments, we have up to five people calling at the same 
time. During the first experiment, a price increase was 
announced 57 times and a price decrease was announced 56 
times. During the second experiment, a price increase was 
announced 80 times and a decrease was announced 79 times. 
There are usually several minutes between price changes. 
However, in both experiments, we find that after a price 
increase or decrease, the percentage of calls that terminates in 
the next few minutes remain unchanged at around 6%. See 
Figure 8 for the percentage of calls dropped after a price 
increase.  
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Figure 8: The percentage of calls terminating after a price increase.  
We expected to see a higher percentage of calls get 
dropped after a price increase. From talking to some users, 
they do not react to price changes because they do not know 
how long the price increases or decreases will last. Whenever 
they notice a price increase, they hope that the increase is 
only temporary. Thus we think that for congestion pricing to 
be effective, the price changes need to be more permanent to 
entice users to change their behaviors
2. 
                                                 
2 We confirmed this hypothesis in later congestion pricing experiments 
where we informed users that each price change will last at least 3 minutes. 
Access-Device Pricing 
For access-device pricing, we find that we cannot entice 
users to switch their access devices. Based on our surveys, 
even though using our service from a computer received high 
mean opinion scores, users felt that they do not need to 
switch because they can use free Internet telephony services 
like Dialpad and Net2Phone on their computers.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
      Congestion pricing has the potential to efficiently 
allocate scarce resources. To study its benefits, we use a 
computer-telephony-service to conduct different pricing 
experiments with students in the dormitories. We deployed 
the service for two semesters to about 40 users. We do not 
charge users real money, but limit each user to a certain 
number of tokens a week for using the service. With our 
token scheme as the budget constraint, we can use static 
pricing policies like time-of-day pricing and call-duration 
pricing can entice users to talk at another time or talk shorter. 
However, we cannot use a simple congestion pricing scheme 
to encourage users to talk less. The users do not change their 
behavior under our congestion pricing scheme because they 
do not know how long the price increases or decreases will 
last. Thus to make congestion pricing more effective, we 
believe that the price changes need to be more permanent to 
entice users to modify their behaviors
2.  
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